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Récemment, plusieurs gouvernements, au Canada, ont montré une volonté accrue de subventionner des 
projets d’investissement privé, en particulier dans le secteur manufacturier, à la plus grande déception 
de ceux qui ont une approche conservatrice en matière d’impôt. Dans cet article, j’analyse dans quelles 
circonstances ces subventions ont leur raison d’être, en m’attardant tout particulièrement aux efforts des 
gouvernements ontarien et fédéral pour attirer de nouveaux investissements dans le secteur automobile. 
J’évalue le prix que les gouvernements devraient s’attendre à payer quand ils s’engagent dans une guerre 
d’enchères et estiment le gain de bien-être qu’ils espèrent faire. Mon analyse suggère que, contrairement à 
que l’on entend dans les débats publics et à ce que l’on lit dans plusieurs études existantes, ce n’est pas la 
somme absolue des gains que l’on doit considérer, mais l’attractivité relative de la société qui investit et la 
taille relative des coûts externes dans chaque lieu où l’on espère attirer un investisseur.
Mots clés : investissement direct à l’étranger, concurrence entre gouvernements, subventions, incitations 
à l’investissement, industrie automobile, coût de renonciation
Recently, several governments in Canada have shown an increased willingness to subsidize private invest-
ment projects, especially in the manufacturing sector, to the dismay of tax conservatives. I evaluate under 
what circumstances these government subsidies make sense, paying particular attention to the efforts of 
the Ontario and federal governments to attract new investments in the automobile sector. I show what 
governments should expect to pay when they join a bidding war and derive the expected welfare gain. The 
analysis suggests that, in contrast with the public debate and many previous studies, it is not the absolute 
size of benefits that matters, but the relative private attractiveness for the investing firm and the relative 
size of externalities in each location.
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That C$100 million will not only be worth its 
value, but will transform into many more hun-
dreds of millions of dollars for the economy of 
our province and our country.
—Joe Volpe, federal Minister of Human   
Resources and Skills Development
The federal politicians have misplaced their 
brains regarding subsidies to the auto sector.
—John Williamson, Director of   
the Canadian Taxpayers Federation
motiVation
I
n recent years, Canadian governments have 
showered the automotive industry with subsidy 
money. Newspapers quotes like the above—when 
the federal government announced in late 2004 that 
it would match the Ontario government’s investment 
subsidy for the modernization of Ford’s Oakville as-
sembly plant—underscore that this policy is highly 
controversial.
Criticism has intensified recently as the econom-
ic growth slowdown, the appreciating loonie, and 
rising gasoline prices have led to numerous layoffs 
in the Canadian automotive industry. Employment 
at Ford and General Motors, two of the largest bene-
ficiaries of the subsidies, has been hit particularly 
hard. Critics allege that the government dished out 
a lot of money without receiving any employment 
guarantees. To this, the government has responded 
that the employment picture would be even grim-
mer without the $7 billion in investments attracted 
by the subsidies.
As an economist studying this industry, I am 
often asked by journalists, but also by colleagues, 
students, and even government officials, whether 
these subsidies are a good deal for the Canadian 
taxpayer. In the general debate, and to some extent 
also in the academic literature, the strategic nature 
of this decision is often underemphasized. The 
counterfactual, what would have happened in the 
absence of the subsidies, is not obvious.
When Canada or Ontario offers an investment 
subsidy, the issue is less whether an investment will 
be made, but rather whether Canada is able to attract 
it away from competing jurisdictions, mostly US 
states. The location choice for a new investment can 
best be viewed as a Nash equilibrium in a game where 
different jurisdictions compete. Even though Ontario 
might be the ideal location, offering no subsidies at 
all might very well lead to the loss of a project to a 
more aggressive jurisdiction. Strategic issues, notably 
subsidy responses of competitors and the risk of the 
winner’s curse, should be considered explicitly.
A contribution of this article is to introduce an 
intuitive graphical analysis of the equilibrium of 
the bidding game. Under a number of plausible as-
sumptions for the situation considered, it illustrates 
optimal bids and predicts ex ante welfare outcomes. 
This reveals that, in sharp contrast with the public 
debate and many previous studies, it is not the ab-
solute size of benefits that matters, but the relative 
private attractiveness for the investing firm and the 
relative size of externalities in each location.
I start with an overview of the different Canadian 
incentive programs in the second section to highlight 
the baffling amount of money involved. Next, in the 
third section, I review the usual case for interven-
tion and list the externalities that proponents often 
anticipate, with some cautionary notes. It is widely 
appreciated in the academic literature that for these 
interventions to be welfare improving, they should 
not be zero-sum. There need to be externalities that 
raise the value of the resources devoted to these 
projects over and above their value in alternative 
uses. In the fourth section, the optimal strategies 
are analyzed. The analysis suggests there could be a 
severe risk of overbidding if benefits are uncertain.
In the fifth section, I discuss a novel approach to 
evaluate the welfare impact of projects ex post. This Bidding for Investment Projects: Smart Public Policy or Corporate Welfare?  S3
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approach sidesteps the measurement of opportunity 
costs and externalities, which have been major chal-
lenges in cost-benefit analyses of subsidy programs. 
The evidence on past US subsidies suggests that, 
on average, overbidding was not a problem. This 
finding has to be qualified by the existence of two 
more strategic considerations. First, jurisdictions 
bidding to attract an investment project can try, often 
successfully, to shift some of the cost to a higher 
jurisdiction. Second, firms can increase competition 
between jurisdictions to extract subsidies by making 
their projects more mobile.
The paper concludes with an assessment of cur-
rent practice and a couple of suggestions as to how 
Canadian subsidy policies could be improved to 
avoid some of the pitfalls discussed.
inVestment incentiVes in canada, 
1984–2008
Molot (2005) summarizes two waves of foreign direct 
investment into the North American automotive indus-
try; summary statistics are presented in Table 1. The 
initial wave in the 1980s first established production 
capacity for Japanese firms on the continent. A total 
of $4.81 billion (in constant 1983 US dollars) was 
invested in eight American and four Canadian projects, 
creating 23,600 direct assembly jobs. Because reports 
of incentives vary considerably and often include 
hard-to-quantify infrastructure spending by local gov-
ernments, Molot (2005) lists a low and high estimate. 
The total value of the incentive packages offered in 
the United States is estimated to lie between $429 and 
$858 million and in Canada between $243 and $273 
million. This amounts to a subsidy of between $28,475 
and $47,924 per job.1
These large sums of money, often awarded in 
an ad hoc fashion, generated a lot of criticism, 
but also attracted attention to the likely benefits 
associated with these investment projects. Even 
more North American jurisdictions competed to 
attract the foreign plants established in the second 
wave in the 1990s, raising the average subsidy to 
$54,486–$76,667 per job created (still in constant 
1983 US dollars). The conservative estimate of the 
incentive package for the Mercedes-Benz plant in 
Alabama amounts to 84 percent of its initial capital 
cost. While Canada received more than its fair share 
of the early investments, no greenfield investments 
Table 1
Greenfield Automotive Investment Projects in North America by Foreign Firms (1980–2000)
Number of Plants Announced Other 
Bids
Average Project Size   Total Incentivesa   Support
Total Jap JV EU SK   empl. veh./year US$ mil.   US$ mil. % of Inv. US$/job   F S/P L
United States
8 5 3 1980–1987 5.0 2,338 182,500 426.3 643.4 18.9 34,406 3 6 3
6 3 2 1 1992–2000 5.5 2,400 189,667 512.1 914.7 29.8 63,517 3 6 5
Canada
4 2 1   1 1984–1986 18.3 1,225 107,500 351.3   258.2 18.3 48,098   2 3 2
Notes: Dollar values are in 1983 constant US dollars. JV = joint ventures between US and Japanese firms. EU = European. SK = South 
Korean. F = federal. S/P = state or provincial. L = local government.
a Average of the high and low estimates. 
Source: Calculations based on statistics in Molot (2005).S4  Johannes Van Biesebroeck
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were attracted in this second wave. Political econ-
omy considerations of foreign owners, hesitant to 
antagonize the United States, were one important 
factor, but the Canadian government’s stated re-
luctance to compete with incentives was another.2
The competition to attract new plants continued 
into the next decade. Toyota’s new pickup truck 
plant in Texas attracted a $133 million subsidy 
(nominally in 2003) from the state. The first Kia 
plant in North America, announced in 2006 for West 
Point, Georgia, came with a state incentive package 
of $258 million and a further $151 million from local 
governments and utilities.
In April 2004, the Ontario government announced 
the  Ontario Automotive  Investment  Strategy 
(OAIS), plunging itself into the bidding game to 
attract new investments. A total of $500 million 
Canadian dollars was committed to subsidize up to 
10 percent of the capital cost. The federal Canadian 
Skills and Innovation Project doubled the available 
subsidies for the industry. The complete list of 
funded projects is shown in Table 2.
These are only two of a long list of programs that 
firms can draw on for investment support. As of 
January 2008, the Ontario government’s web portal 
for initiatives to attract foreign investors listed 73 
programs offering subsidies or tax credits.3 The 
Advanced Manufacturing Investment Strategy ($500 
million over five years) is geared toward innovation 
and advanced technologies; Strategic Manufactur-
ing Investment grants (average annual budget of 
$63 million) provide support under the Ministry 
of Economic Development and Trade’s general 
Investment and Trade Strategy; and projects involv-
ing clean automotive and other green technologies 
can draw on the Next Generation Jobs Fund ($650 
million over five years). Total support from just the 
four largest Ontario programs averaged a staggering 
$400 million per year (2003–2008?), much of it for 
automotive investments; see Table 3. In addition, 
there are infrastructure funds at the provincial or 
federal level that provide accompanying financing.
Entries for the Quebec and federal governments 
illustrate that support for manufacturing investments 
is not limited to Ontario.4 For example, measures 
announced in the 2007 budgets have lead to an in-
crease in the federal Capital Cost Allowance rate to 
50 percent and will lead to the phased abolishment 
of the Capital Tax in Quebec by 2011.
The decision problem for Ontario, with a stock of 
existing plants with aging equipment, is similar to 
that of Michigan. The investment projects supported 
lately by the Michigan Economic Development Cor-
poration, listed in the top panel of Table 2, illustrate 
a similar willingness to subsidize the refurbishing of 
existing plants as long as something unique was on 
offer, for example, the first American-owned flex-
ible assembly plant (GM) or a green roof and other 
environmental innovations (Ford). The Michigan 
Economic Development Corporation also succeeded 
in attracting Hyundai’s technical research centre and 
in securing an expansion of Toyota’s technical centre 
in Ann Arbor, cementing the state’s prominence in 
the industry’s high-tech activities.5
A recurring theme in the debate over subsidies is 
whether to favour a general or targeted approach. 
For example, automotive firms are lobbying to 
expand the Manufacturers and Processors Tax 
Deduction, which would effectively reduce their 
corporate income tax rates to 17 percent federally 
and 8 percent provincially. Rather than award this 
selective benefit, the federal government chose 
to lower income tax rates for all firms in its 2008 
budget. Instead of targeting specific investments, 
it is providing funding according to well-defined 
criteria, for example, for training and apprentice-
ships and for a Scientific Research and Experimental 
Development Fund. Similarly, the 2008 federal Eco-
nomic Hardship Fund provides broad-based support 
for single-industry towns affected by volatility in 
commodity, currency, and financial markets. This 
contrasts with the similarly motivated aid package 
in Quebec, which provides tax measures, training, 
and direct assistance specifically for the manufac-
turing sector.Bidding for Investment Projects: Smart Public Policy or Corporate Welfare?  S5
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Table 2
Subsidized Automotive Investment Projects in Michigan and Ontario, 2002–2006
Firm Location What Opened Project Size Incentives (US$ mil.) Returna
      Empl. (US$ mil.) Totalb per job MI tax exp (%)
United States – Michigan Economic Development Corporation
General Motors Lansing Gr. River assembly 2002 1,500 500 169.0 112,667 108.0 19.4
Ford Dearborn (Rouge) assembly 2004 3,800 1,000 222.0 58,421 156.0 8.5
Global Engine Allc Dundee engines 2005 400 375  55.0 137,500  26.8 2.8
Hyundai Ann Arbor technical centre 2005 400 117  28.7 71,750  22.0 4.7
Firm Location What Announced Project Size Incentives (C$ mil.)
      Empl. (C$ mil.) Totald per job ON contrib.
Canada – Ontario Automotive Investment Strategy
Ford Oakville assembly 2004 3,000 1,000 200.0 66,667 100.0
General Motors Beacon project assembly, engines 2005 4 plants 2,500 400.0 235.0
DaimlerChrysler Windsor, Brampton assembly, R&D 2005 2 plants 768 122.8 76.8
Toyota Woodstock assembly 2005 2,000 1,100 125.3 62,650 70.0
Navistare Chatham, Windsor assembly, R&D 2005 hundreds 270 62.0 32.0
Linamar Guelph parts & skills centre 2006 3,000 1,100 51.0 17,000 44.5
Honda Alliston engines 2006 340 154 15.4 45,294 15.4
Valiant Corp. Windsor assembly system 2006 93 7.1 7.1
Nemak Windsor engine techn. 2006 hundreds 100 6.0 6.0
AGS Automotive Oshawa, other bumpers 2006 344 62 6.0 17,442 6.0  
Notes: All statistics refer to the original announcements; subsequent capacity additions were often made. 
aRatio of expected new state revenue (over following 20 years) to Michigan’s tax expenditure. bTotal incentives are combination of job retention MEGA 
(Michigan Economic Growth Authority), high technology MEGA, property tax abatement, public infrastructure, job training, and single business tax 
brownfield credit. cJoint venture of DaimlerChrysler, Hyundai, and Mitsubishi. dFederal and provincial grants. eInternational Truck and Engine Corporation 
(Navistar).  
Source: US data are from Donaldsen (2003); Canadian data are from Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Trade website at  
http://www.ontariocanada.com/ontcan/1medt/en/news_archives_en.jsp
the case for incentiVes
In 2004 and 2005, the federal and Ontario gov-
ernments pledged $910 million dollars to build 
or modernize automotive assembly plants. What 
makes it so desirable to attract these plants? A few 
things stand out. Jobs in this industry, especially in 
assembly plants, are well paid and there are a lot 
of them. The industry is R&D intensive and uses 
advanced equipment. Workers receive training in 
high-tech manufacturing techniques, enhancing both 
the supply of and demand for skilled labour. There 
is a guaranteed multiplier effect as assembly plants 
generate additional demand for the parts sector and 
business services.
Still, for all these benefits to warrant government 
intervention, there need to be some externalities. S6  Johannes Van Biesebroeck
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Only if markets fail to price inputs correctly or if the 
firm is unable to capture all benefits associated with 
its activities can we justify handing over taxpayers’ 
money to attract the investment. Proponents of these 
investment subsidies tend to stress agglomeration 
effects, technology spillovers, human capital for-
mation, market power rents, and tax or regulatory 
distortions.6 We discuss these factors in turn with 
some cautionary remarks.
Agglomeration Effects
A large economic geography literature studies 
agglomeration effects that lead to clustering of 
economic activity. It is assumed that a firm’s 
Table 3
Principal Subsidy and Incentive Programs for Manufacturing Investments in Canada (2003–2008)
Program Announced Duration Value Focus
  (month/year) (years) (C$ mil.)  
Ontario
Large-Scale Strategic Investment Initiative 2/2003 axed 650 R&D, skills training, and infrastructure
Strategic Manufacturing Investment indef. 63/yeara Support for general Investment and Trade 
Strategy
Ontario Automotive Investment Strategy 4/2004 5 500 Automotive assembly and Tier 1 
suppliersb 
Advanced Manufacturing Investment Strategy 12/2005   5 500 Investments in technology and 
innovationb
Next Generation Jobs Fund 6/2007 5 650 Clean automotive and green technology 
(+other) 
Quebec
Agreement with GM 2/2003 5 290 Developing a network of automotive 
suppliers
Strategic Investment Support Program 10/2004 indef. 75  Investment support for manufacturing 
(+ other)
Regional Economic Intervention Funds 12/2004 indef. 210  (i) direct support, (ii) regional investment 
fund, (iii) venture capital
Capital Tax Credit Budget 2007 4 n/a Gradual elimination of tax on capital by 
2011
Aid package (cope with dollar appreciation) 11/2007 5 620 70% training & direct assistance, 30% tax 
breaks
Federal
Canadian Skills & Innovation Project 6/2004 5 1,000 Investment support for automotive and 
aerospace
Capital Cost Allowance increased to 50% Budget 2007 3 n/a General investment incentive
Economic Hardship Fund 1/2008 1 1,000 Single-industry towns suffering market 
volatility
Notes: aAverage for the last three budget years (2005–2008). bThese programs are subject to minimum scale requirements: $300m or 300 
jobs for the Ontario Automotive Investment Strategy, $25m or 100 jobs for the Advanced Manufacturing Investment Strategy. 
Source: Author’s compilation from various government and media websites.Bidding for Investment Projects: Smart Public Policy or Corporate Welfare?  S7
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productivity is higher or its costs lower if it locates 
closer to other firms (Head, Ries, and Swenson 
1999).7 Possible reasons are information sharing, 
technology spillovers, and the availability of spe-
cialized workers, suppliers, or infrastructure.
Success in attracting one project will thus boost 
the location’s attractiveness for all future invest-
ments. The 2005 decision by Toyota to locate its 
seventh North American assembly plant in Wood-
stock, Ontario, was certainly influenced by the 
proximity of its existing Cambridge operation. The 
two plants share many of the existing suppliers, 
and Toyota’s increased scale in Ontario makes it 
feasible to bring more of its preferred suppliers to 
the province.
Attracting early investments also has a defensive 
function. Agglomeration economies make it difficult 
for firms to unilaterally switch locations if an area 
becomes less attractive, for example, because of 
adverse exchange rate movements (Holmes 1999).8
Agglomeration effects are especially important 
in the automotive industry, because assembly plants 
generate demand for parts. Just-in-time inventory 
systems make it difficult for suppliers to locate 
more than 400 miles away (Klier 1999). Increas-
ingly, automakers outsource the subassembly of 
entire modules, such as seats, bumper assemblies, 
or entire dashboards. As these modules are produced 
in the same order as the cars into which they will be 
installed, suppliers have to locate in the immediate 
vicinity. A nearby location will lower transportation 
costs and avoid costly delays—externalities from 
the perspective of suppliers.
Research by the Center for Automotive Research 
suggests that for every job created in a US as-
sembly plant in the 1990s, a further 2.9 jobs were 
created in US supplier plants (McAlinden, Hill, 
and Swiecki 2003). The authors further estimate 
that the expenditures of these workers create addi-
tional “expenditure-induced” jobs elsewhere in the 
economy. The economic multiplier they highlight 
is that each additional worker at an automaker cor-
responds to 7.6 more workers in the economy. The 
move to increased outsourcing by automakers made 
them revise this number upward to 10.6 for 2006.
It would seem, then, that spending some incentive 
money to attract an assembly plant could generate a 
big return. However, it is a crucial mistake to count 
all employment as net gains. Most of the workers 
counted in these calculations are likely to have 
had alternative employment in the absence of the 
automotive investment. There is scant evidence that 
employment is actually boosted by attracting these 
projects. Benefits are realized only to the extent that 
these jobs create more value, which is certainly not 
the case for the expenditure-induced employment 
effects. This type of analysis ignores that resources 
have opportunity costs that are forfeited by employ-
ing them in the proposed way.
Technology Spillovers
Another supposed benefit of attracting an innova-
tive firm is the generation of technology spillovers, 
either directly through knowledge sharing or dem-
onstration effects, or indirectly through the labour 
market. The automotive industry is becoming in-
creasingly high tech, spending more on R&D than 
any other industry (Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck 
2007). It is also unrivalled in its use of robots and 
other advanced manufacturing equipment.
Previous research has shown that knowledge 
and technology spillovers are larger between firms 
that are geographically close (Jaffe, Trajtenberg, 
and Henderson 1993). Greenstone, Hornbeck, and 
Moretti (2007) exploit a natural experiment to iden-
tify a positive effect of a large investment project on 
total factor productivity of nearby firms. They find 
the strongest effect on firms that are likely to share 
workers and use the same technologies.
Two caveats are in order. First, while the auto-
motive industry as a whole is very technologically 
intensive, this applies less to assembly plants, which 
are the main recipients of investment incentives. S8  Johannes Van Biesebroeck
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Increasingly, governments are adding conditions to 
incentive contracts for local R&D and co-location of 
higher value-added activities, but these conditions 
are hard to monitor and enforce. Second, while 
potential spillovers can be large, they might not 
materialize. Blomström and Kokko (2003) survey 
evidence, often from developing countries, that local 
firms have limited ability to absorb the advanced 
technology from multinationals attracted by invest-
ment incentives.
Human Capital Formation
Wage rates in the automotive industry exceed aver-
age manufacturing wages in the same locations, 
partly because of human capital differences. The 
widespread adoption of lean manufacturing tech-
niques and advanced machinery gives employers 
an incentive to invest in complementary worker 
training (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). Attracting 
a modern manufacturing plant shifts some of the 
burden of (re-)training the workforce to the new 
employer. Training subsidies invariably figure 
prominently in incentive packages.
However, firms often succeed in internalizing 
externalities. To the extent that workers acquire 
skills that are not firm-specific, wage differences 
will not reflect human capital differences as work-
ers may be willing to work for a high-tech firm for 
lower pay because it constitutes an investment in 
valuable skills. The secular decline of manufactur-
ing also limits the value of newly acquired skills in 
this sector, as future job opportunities are increas-
ingly concentrated in services. Providing generous 
incentives might only postpone the eventual transi-
tion into the service sector.
Market Power Rents
An alternative explanation for high automotive sec-
tor wages is the ability of labour unions to extract 
rents in an oligopolistic industry. Entry barriers in 
this industry are high, and incumbents as a group 
are expected to earn positive profits (Helper 1991). 
If workers are able to appropriate some of these 
economic profits, the accounting profits of the firms 
will suffer, without diminishing the attractiveness 
of these projects. A rational government should be 
willing to pay for the privilege of having its citizens 
employed in an industry that pays rents.
This mirrors an argument from the strategic 
trade literature. As there are economic profits in 
oligopolistic or monopoly industries, the value 
created exceeds the resource costs and therefore 
the country hosting these industries will benefit 
(Brander and Spencer 1981). However, just as was 
recognized in that literature, we expect different 
jurisdictions (countries) to compete for these in-
dustries, which will transfer some of the rents back 
to the companies.
Tax Distortions
Finally, existing government interventions in the 
economy create distortions that may lead to inef-
ficient outcomes. For example, the “average cost” 
pricing of public services through taxation often 
exceeds the marginal cost of providing the services. 
This provides a role for subsidies, in terms of tax 
cuts or free additional service provision, to achieve 
efficient location decisions and optimal investment 
levels (Black and Hoyt 1989).
Alternatively, employment insurance or ex-
cessive workplace regulations can lead to an 
undervaluation of employment benefits. If the 
shadow wage—the opportunity cost of time—is 
below the nominal wage, economic activity attracted 
through investment subsidies can provide a net 
welfare benefit (Barros and Cabral 2000). Neven 
and Siotis (1993) propose this mechanism as a way 
to overcome “strong distortions” in the European 
Union labour market.
This argument clearly has merit, but such distor-
tions are ubiquitous. Detractors of discretionary 
incentive packages sensibly argue that it is more 
efficient to lower distortionary taxes or regulations 
uniformly rather than selectively for one industry.Bidding for Investment Projects: Smart Public Policy or Corporate Welfare?  S9
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comPetition for ProJects
If an investment project is expected to generate 
local benefits over and beyond its resource costs, 
it is likely to be pursued by many jurisdictions, 
especially if externalities are large and not too cer-
tain and the previous concerns carry less weight. In 
such a competitive situation, it is not the total size 
of externalities, the focus of most of the literature, 
that matters most. The net welfare gain is determined 
by the fraction of externalities and private benefits 
that are unique to the winning location.
Jurisdictions will engage in a bidding war, offer-
ing competing incentive packages to increase the 
relative attractiveness of their locality. As a result, 
some of the social benefits will be competed away, 
or rather, will be transferred to the firm making the 
investment decision. To study the equilibrium of 
such a bidding game, I simply posit differences in 
relative costs and externalities for two jurisdictions 
and illustrate the optimal bids and location choice.
I make the following assumptions: (a) at least 
two jurisdictions enter the bidding game, (b) both 
the project and the subsidies are lump-sum amounts, 
and (c) all participants know the size of their own 
and their opponents’ private and social benefits as-
sociated with the project. While these assumptions 
will not be satisfied in every situation, they are quite 
plausible for automotive investments. The number 
of jurisdictions actively wooing investors ranged 
from 3 to 43 per year, averaging more than 8—see 
the “other bids” column in Table 1. The size of the 
plant, in terms of dollars invested and jobs involved, 
is always specified in advance and subsidies are 
committed contractually before construction starts.9
The most ambitious assumption relates to the 
observability of the benefits in advance, as an 
analysis with uncertainty would be much more 
complicated.10 While this assumption is obviously 
violated in practice, at least three factors facilitate 
the collection of information. First, assembly plants 
are built over and over, allowing participants to 
learn over time. Second, given the public money 
involved, governments worldwide regularly evalu-
ate their subsidy programs and make the findings 
public most of the time.11 Third, the high visibility 
of automobile assembly plants in the public eye and 
the large size of investment projects guarantee a lot 
of attention with information being uncovered and 
disseminated by pressure groups, regular and trade 
press, consulting firms, and academic researchers. 
Finally, the results are still valid with subsidy offers 
based on expected benefits, but only if participants 
are risk-averse and their expectations coincide.
Figure 1 provides a graphical analysis. Consider 
a situation where Canada and the United States 
compete to attract an assembly plant. In this hypo-
thetical example, I assume that the private value of 
the project is higher in Canada, for example because 
of lower labour costs.12 The difference in private 
benefits is denoted by A on the horizontal axis. In 
the absence of subsidies, the carmaker would prefer 
a Canadian location.
The project generates local externalities, indicat-
ed on each country’s axis, that exceed the intrinsic 
cost difference A. As a result, the US government has 
an incentive to attract the plant by offering a subsidy 
package of at least A. In the first case considered, I 
assume that these externalities (social benefits) are 
highest in Canada (SBC >SBUS), perhaps because the 
shadow price of labour is lower, such that the Can-
adian government will trump any rational US bid.
The best response function for the US govern-
ment—its optimal bidding strategy as a function of 
the Canadian bid—is indicated by the solid black 
line. It bids A more than Canada up to the value of 
its own local externalities, the vertical solid line at 
SBUS. Canada will offer incentives only if the US 
package is sufficient to outweigh its own intrinsic 
advantage of A. Above this level it matches its rival’s 
offer cent for cent, indicated by the short-dashed 
line, up to its own social benefit level SBC
1, the S10  Johannes Van Biesebroeck
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horizontal section of the Canadian best response 
function.
The intersection of the two best response func-
tions gives the equilibrium subsidy. The winning 
jurisdiction does not have to offer its entire surplus, 
only enough to make the firm indifferent between 
itself and the next best alternative. The runner-up 
jurisdiction, however, drops out of the bidding war 
only after offering the entire surplus it could have 
expected from the project.
In this example, the equilibrium is for Canada 
to attract the investment, offering an incentive 
package of SBUS – A (indicated by the arrow on the 
vertical axis). The net welfare gain for the Canadian 
economy equals SBC
1 diminished by its bid, or (PBC 
– PBUS) + (SBC
1 – SBUS) = A + B1. In equilibrium, it 
retains only the difference between its own private 
and social benefits and the corresponding benefits 
in the runner-up location.
Two crucial insights can be taken away. First, 
even though the value of the project to the local 
economy might be large, a fraction is transferred 
to the investing firm through the incentive pack-
age. The net welfare gain falls short of the full 
social surplus by the amount of social surplus that 
Figure 1
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would potentially be generated elsewhere, minus 
any intrinsic private cost advantage. At the same 
time, the net expected welfare gain for the winning 
jurisdiction does not fall all the way to zero if there 
are some unique benefits.
Second, even if one jurisdiction is the logical 
place for the project in the absence of competition, 
abstaining from the bidding war is not optimal. Even 
though Canada has an intrinsic cost advantage and 
larger spillovers, without a Canadian bid a US incen-
tive package worth A would succeed in attracting 
the project, for a net US welfare gain.
An additional insight can be gained by consid-
ering a minor change to the example, namely, a 
situation where US externalities exceed Canadian 
ones. The relative size of the private difference, fa-
vouring Canada, and the social difference, favouring 
the United States, will then determine which country 
succeeds in attracting the project. As long as the 
difference in social benefits is less than A, Canada 
still prevails for a net welfare gain of A + B, or A – 
|B| in this case, as B = SBC – SBUS is now negative.
The situation represented by Case 2 in Figure 1 
is for the US advantage in externalities outweighing 
the intrinsic private advantage of locating in Canada. 
The new best response curve for Canada, indicated 
by the long-dashed line, now turns horizontal much 
earlier, at SBC
2. The winning US bid becomes SBC
2 
+ A, indicated by the arrow on the horizontal axis, 
and the net US welfare gain is –(A + B2) or |B2| – A. 
Crucially, while the surplus generated might still be 
large, only a minor fraction will accrue to the local 
economy of the winning bidder. The majority is now 
transferred to the firm.
This leads to the third insight. As the net welfare 
gain is determined by the difference in valuations for 
the two jurisdictions, overbidding even by a small 
percentage can lead to a reduction in local welfare. 
Especially given that benefits will be somewhat 
uncertain in practice and that the highest bidder 
wins, participants should heed the winner’s curse. 
The optimal bidding strategy under uncertainty will 
surely be more cautious than the strategies I derived 
without uncertainty.
If externalities are generated endogenously, the 
following equilibrium can exist. A new investment 
creates positive externalities that are increasing 
in the level of local activity, for example through 
technology spillovers on existing firms. At the same 
time, the induced labour demand pushes up local 
wages more if the local activity level is high, for 
example because of shortages in the labour market. 
Compared to locating an investment project in a 
sparse area, a firm that chooses a dense area gener-
ates higher social benefits (B > 0) but incurs larger 
private costs (A < 0).
To entice any firm to the dense area, the local 
government needs to offer some of the externalities 
as an incentive package. In equilibrium, the optimal 
bid equals the full value of B = |A| and firms will 
be indifferent where to locate. The distribution of 
economic activity is then determined by the way 
demand effects and spillovers increase with the 
local activity level. Head et al. (1999) offer one 
illustration of such an equilibrium.
eValuating Past suBsidies
A Natural Experiment Approach
Even if a jurisdiction expects a project to generate 
positive externalities, these need to be quantified to 
learn its own willingness to pay. This is tricky, as 
externalities by their very nature are not captured 
in prices. Greenstone and Moretti (2003) developed 
an ingenious way to indirectly evaluate spillovers 
on the regional economy, avoiding the need to 
distinguish between the market price and shadow 
cost of input factors. While their approach is of no 
help for a province or state trying to determine how 
much subsidy to offer for a new project, it helps in 
evaluating past subsidy offers. Jurisdictions can use 
evidence for the presence or absence of past overbid-
ding to evaluate their existing policies.S12  Johannes Van Biesebroeck
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By matching locations that were selected as sites 
of large industrial projects with those that narrowly 
lost out in the final round of the site selection pro-
cess, Greenstone and Moretti (2003) construct a 
natural experiment. The maintained assumption is 
that the final choice between the “winning” county 
and the runner-up “losing” county is random, due 
to idiosyncratic factors. If after an extensive search 
a company narrowed the choice to only two coun-
ties, excluding thousands of potential locations, 
those final two must be quite similar in all relevant 
aspects. In the absence of the investment project, 
we expect them to have had similar future prospects.
Greenstone and Moretti (2003) then exploit that 
local property values will capture on an ongoing 
basis the collective judgment of existing and po-
tential residents on the present discounted value of 
the expect profit stream of living in a locality.13 In a 
sample of 92 counties, the authors find that property 
values are increased by approximately 1.1 percent 
to 1.7 percent in winning versus losing counties and 
that the difference is statistically significant. Some 
net benefits, taking all relevant costs into account, 
seem to exist. They also find a 1.5 percent trend 
break in labour earnings in the new plant’s industry 
in winning counties, suggesting one channel for 
the positive externalities. These results undermine 
the view that the provision of local subsidies to at-
tract large industrial plants reduces local residents’ 
welfare.
Clearly, this approach only works ex post after 
investments are made and cannot provide guidance 
whether to subsidize a new project or not. It can be 
used, however, to evaluate past interventions and 
therefore also the methods used to predict exter-
nalities ex ante. The authors expected jurisdictional 
competition to have competed away all local welfare 
benefits. They were surprised to find some remain-
ing positive effects, suggesting that governments are 
not overbidding. Our preceding analysis illustrates 
how this outcome occurs naturally if locations are 
heterogeneous.
Jurisdictions Try to Extract Cross-Subsidies
Greenstone and Moretti (2003) assume that their 
empirical strategy controls adequately for any real 
heterogeneity, but they leave open the possibility 
of heterogeneity in the ability to attract subsidies 
from a higher level of government. While their 
evidence points to some local benefits, these might 
simply derive from the cross-subsidization of a local 
investment project by a wider group of taxpayers, 
who derive no benefits. If a locality is able to secure 
contributions from a higher level of government, 
it might very well benefit, while the nation as a 
whole loses. The importance of federal and state or 
provincial subsidies in the automotive industry (see 
Table 1) makes this a distinct possibility. The posi-
tive effects identified above should thus be treated 
as an upper bound.
The solution is straightforward, at least in theory: 
the incidence of the subsidy cost should be matched 
to the area where the externality benefits will be 
realized. Just as Dahlby (2005) concludes that a 
provincial R&D tax subsidy is not warranted for 
Alberta, automotive investment subsidies are war-
ranted for Ontario only to the extent that there are 
provincewide spillovers.
Determining the optimal area at which to con-
struct policy raises a further issue. It is sometimes 
suggested  that  NAFTA  should  have  been  ac-
companied with coordination to avoid “wasteful” 
tax competition. From an efficiency perspective, 
subsidies can play an important role in steering 
investment to the ideal location in the presence of 
externalities. Global welfare will be enhanced by 
subsidies, but if Japanese multinationals are able to 
extract most of the externalities they generate, North 
American jurisdictions might benefit by coordinat-
ing not to offer any subsidies.
Firms Try to Make Projects Mobile
While jurisdictions will try to shift some of the sub-
sidy burden to a higher level of government, firms 
will try to enhance competition for their projects and Bidding for Investment Projects: Smart Public Policy or Corporate Welfare?  S13
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hence subsidies. Some of the incentives under the 
Ontario Automotive Investment Strategy have gone 
to the new Toyota assembly plant in Woodstock, 
which started production in late 2008, but the bulk of 
the money has been committed to refurbish existing 
General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler plants—so-
called brownfield investments.
This highlights a dynamic. Once a jurisdiction 
acquires a reputation for subsidizing investments, 
existing producers will use the threat of relocating 
to tap the jurisdiction to subsidize ongoing invest-
ments. In some cases, for example the Ford Oakville 
plant, it is possible that the plant would have closed 
without the new subsidies.14 In contrast, the incen-
tive package for General Motors’ Beacon Project 
involved all its Ontario assembly and engine plants.
To minimize crowding out of private investment, 
only projects exceeding $300 million or generating 
300 jobs qualified for support under the OAIS. This 
allowed the government to focus on larger projects, 
which are likely to be more internationally mobile. 
While the Toyota and Ford assembly plants, and the 
Honda engine plant in Alliston, are well-defined and 
delineated projects, many others are more open-
ended or combine several investment programs to 
reach the minimum scale. Often it was impossible 
to identify a well-defined number of positions the 
investment project involved, let alone jobs created 
or saved.
A related political problem is that large firms 
are able to extract subsidies for one project, while 
maintaining freedom to decide independently on 
other projects. Even though General Motors was the 
largest beneficiary of the OAIS, it still announced 
the closure of two of its Oshawa assembly plants in 
2005 and 2008, the first one only a couple of months 
after the government support was finalized.
To protect itself against this type of exploitation, 
the federal government insisted at times on a number 
of conditions. For one, incentives would be clawed 
back if subsequent investment and employment 
levels fell below a certain (undisclosed) level. This 
might have contributed to Ford’s decision to close its 
Michigan plant in Wixom in its 2006 restructuring 
rather than its Ontario plant in St. Thomas—both 
factories assembled full-size rear-drive sedans.
Another condition, pushed especially by the pro-
vincial government, is for subsidy levels to depend 
on factors other than just the amount invested. The 
five criteria for maximum OAIS awards include 
innovation and R&D, infrastructure, energy effi-
ciency, environmental technology, and training and 
skills development. In the Ford Oakville case, the 
company started an R&D fuel-cell centre to convert 
paint-shop emissions into hydrogen fuel. General 
Motors started an Automotive Centre of Excellence 
at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology 
in Oshawa. Still, the funding levels shown in Table 
2 imply that somehow each beneficiary managed 
to qualify under the maximum subsidy level of 10 
percent.15
imProVing industrial suBsidy Policy
The paper has highlighted several concerns with 
the externalities often attributed to large invest-
ment projects. The illustration of optimal subsidy 
strategies and expected welfare when jurisdic-
tions compete further suggests that overbidding 
is a real risk even for rational bidders. This risk is 
compounded by jurisdictions trying to extract cross-
subsidies from higher levels of government and by 
companies trying to make their projects mobile to 
spur competition.
At the same time, the flurry of new programs 
highlights that investment subsidies are not dis-
appearing from the Canadian policy landscape. In 
this final section, I discuss how to adjust these pro-
grams, in light of the earlier analysis, to make them 
more likely to be welfare-improving for Canada. 
I also assess how well current Canadian policy is S14  Johannes Van Biesebroeck
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performing. The analysis has highlighted that it is 
rational to pursue a project if the location-specific 
externalities are sufficient to outweigh any intrin-
sic cost-disadvantage. To make this a credible and 
worthwhile strategy, governments contemplating 
to offer subsidies should (a) identify externali-
ties, (b) measure their size, and (c) assert their 
location-specificity.
First, from an individual jurisdiction’s perspec-
tive, offering an investment subsidy can make sense, 
but only if demonstrable externalities are at stake. 
While offering no incentives is certainly superior 
if the project is not lost to a competing jurisdiction, 
any package up to the full value of expected exter-
nalities is rational if it is needed to retain the project.
To make sure these programs are not seen as mere 
transfers to companies, they should be accompanied 
by an explicit indication of the type of externali-
ties that are expected, and an ex post evaluation of 
whether these were actually realized. Few doubt 
that without the subsidies the automotive industry 
would have seen greater employment losses. At the 
same time, few think that aggregate employment has 
been boosted. The case why it is worthwhile to keep 
these particular jobs, rather than helping workers 
transition to other sectors, is seldom made.
The emphasis in Ontario government press re-
leases on the number of jobs and investment dollars 
involved when new funding is announced is largely 
beside the point. As the government applies the 
same percentage subsidy to all projects, greenfield 
or brownfield, large or small, assembly or parts, it is 
almost certainly overpaying for some. The Ontario 
policy would receive more widespread support if 
a more sophisticated justification was provided, 
identifying and quantifying specific externalities.
As  it  is  currently  implemented,  the  subsi-
dy strat  egy looks very much like pre-election 
vote-grabbing. This is true not only for the On-
tario Liberal government but also for the federal 
Conservative government. Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper performed an astonishing turnaround on 
the eve of the 14 October 2008 election. After con-
tinually refusing to provide earmarked support for 
the automotive industry during his time in office, 
he suddenly announced an $80 million repayable 
grant to Ford Canada on 15 September 2008 and 
suspended a penalty levied against General Motors 
for a violation of its loan provision.
Second, even though the absolute level of the 
optimal incentive package can be as large as the 
total value of externalities, the winning jurisdiction 
will capture only the fraction of externalities that 
corresponds to its unique local advantages. Over-
estimating the value of externalities can easily lead 
to a welfare loss. Unless a government is committed 
to getting the estimates right, it should stay out of 
the bidding game.
Given the flurry of investment programs an-
nounced, a retroactive evaluation is the least to 
hope for. When New Zealand undertook a broad 
evaluation of its foreign direct investment (FDI) at-
traction program in 2007, it ended up abolishing the 
“loans and grants” component of the program (Van 
Biesebroeck 2008). The total amount of externali-
ties potentially at stake was asserted to have been 
insufficient to cover the program’s high cost. The 
least the Canadian government should do is publish 
the evaluation it commissioned of its matching 
subsidies to the OAIS.
The government should also communicate more 
explicitly to pressure groups what an attractive 
project should look like. For example, the Canadian 
Automotive Partnership Council, in which both the 
federal and provincial governments are involved, 
has argued repeatedly that government subsidies 
for automotive investments would generate a high 
return. Invariably, all personal and business income 
taxes associated with the investment project are 
counted as net gains, even though evidence of net 
employment creation is never included.Bidding for Investment Projects: Smart Public Policy or Corporate Welfare?  S15
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Third, while government discretion is often 
viewed  with  suspicion  on  political  economy 
grounds, it is unlikely that a pure rules-based ap-
proach will generate many benefits here. The net 
welfare gain from the subsidy game amounts to the 
location-specific portion of the private and social 
benefits. It is hard to imagine a fixed set of rules 
being able to identify projects in which a locality has 
a particular advantage and to determine the optimal 
bidding strategy. Quite the contrary, if government 
discretion is not tolerated, offering subsidies in 
competition with another jurisdiction can easily 
lead to the winner’s curse. Only those projects will 
be attracted for which the ex post externalities fall 
below those predicted by the ex ante rules.
This task could be performed by requiring any 
government agency or pressure group advocating sub-
sidies to demonstrate why existing programs that are 
intended to align private and social benefits and costs 
are insufficient. Several programs already exist, both 
in Canada and in competing jurisdictions, that address 
some of the externalities discussed in the third sec-
tion. These programs include the Scientific Research 
and Experimental Development tax credit, Industrial 
Research Assistance Program, and Technology Partner-
ships for Canada to facilitate investments with potential 
technological spillovers. As do most countries, the 
federal government and the provinces administer and 
support a variety of training programs, for example, the 
Workplace Skills Initiative, Next Generation Jobs Fund, 
Apprenticeship Incentive Grants, and Apprenticeship 
Training Tax Credit. Incremental support for a new 
investment project should be backed up with evidence 
of well-defined incremental externalities.
The opposite stances of the Liberal Ontario 
government, largely in favour of subsidies, and the 
Conservative federal government, largely opposed, 
likely reflect a split public opinion. The challenge 
is clear: Is it possible to identify and measure suf-
ficiently high externalities that are unique to Canada 
to enter the admittedly risky bidding game? The 
government agencies and departments in charge of 
these subsidy programs, notably Industry Canada, 
could move the debate forward by putting in a ser-
ious effort to answer this exact question.
Notes
1 The per-job subsidy varies tremendously by plant. 
The Toyota plant in Georgetown, Kentucky, is estimated 
to have benefited from at least $55,750 in subsidies per 
job, and the amount could have been as high as $173,300. 
Note that the “jobs created” refer only to this particular 
industry, as there is no evidence of net employment gains 
for the economy as a whole.
2 DaimlerChrysler did consider assembling the Sprinter 
van in its Pillette Road, Windsor facility, but eventually 
decided on a new South Carolina facility in 2005. The 
year before, it had already cancelled plans for a new 
Ontario plant to build small pickups because of “business 
viability” issues.
3 Ontario Ministry of Development and Trade, “Invest in 
Ontario,” http://www.2ontario.com/software/government_ 
programs.asp
4 The Investissement Québec corporation has been very 
active, averaging more than a thousand financing trans-
actions per year, mostly through its Strategic International 
Intervention and Regional Economic Intervention Funds, 
which received initial government contributions of $75 
and $210 million when launched in 2004.
5 While no explicit subsidies were given for the latter 
project, the state sold the land to Toyota for $16 million 
less than a private developer was willing to pay. The 
Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the state’s right to 
consider other factors than the price, including whether 
use of the property would attract skilled jobs.
6 Glaeser (2001) discusses several other factors un-
related to externalities that often lead to incentives, such 
as corruption or lobbying.
7 Head et al. (1999) find evidence of significant 
agglomeration effects in a sample of 760 Japanese 
manufacturing plants of which one-third are active in the 
automotive industry.
8 Exactly half of the 40 most “localized” industries 
discussed by Holmes (1999) are textile related, but the S16  Johannes Van Biesebroeck
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list does include Automotive Stampings, Motor Homes, 
and Motor Vehicles and Car Bodies.
9 Barros and Cabral (2000) consider a model where 
subsidies also affect the investment size decision.
10 King, McAfee, and Welling (1993) consider a 
model with uncertainty and endogenous participation. 
Such an approach also allows for situations where bid-
ding is costly, for example, when cities compete to host 
the Olympics. Note that without uncertainty and costly 
participation, only the best-placed jurisdiction would 
enter and no subsidies would be required. Of course, the 
second-placed jurisdiction would then prefer to enter ex 
post. If decisions are made sequentially, the equilibrium 
would again resemble the one we consider.
11 For example, Industry Canada hired a consulting firm 
to analyze the benefits of the OAIS ex post.
12  This assumption is consistent with the findings of a study 
carried out by the Canadian Automotive Partnership Council; 
see http://www.capcinfo.ca/english/news/exec_summ.html
13 This approach mirrors the use of stock prices in 
event studies used to evaluate a host of issues in the 
finance literature.
14 The adjacent Ontario truck plant did close perma-
nently in August 2004. The future of the Oakville minivan 
plant was also in doubt, as sales were in freefall and it 
operated on a single shift for most of 2005.
15 One explanation is that sometimes (e.g., for Linamar) 
the funded project represents only a fraction of the total 
investment program, for example the most innovative or 
environmental aspects.
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